A cost/benefit matrix model of nuclear deterrence by Barbero, Mark
A COST/BENEFIT MATRIX MODEL
OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Mark Barbero















Thesis Advisor D. L. Abbey








1. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
«. TITLE ("and Subtitle)





9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
S. TYPE OF REPORT ft PERIOO COVERED
Master ' s Thesis
;
March 1975
6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
6. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERfa)
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT. TASK
AREA & WORK UNIT NUM8ERS
It. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 95940




March 19 7 5
13. NUMBER OF PAGES
57
IS. SECURITY CLASS, (of thle report)
Unclassified
15a. DECLASSIFI CATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of thle Report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the ebetract entered In Block 20, If different horn Report)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on revoree elde II ntceeeary end Identify by block number)
nuclear deterrence; cost/benefit matrix analysis; modeling;
credibility; capability
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on rav.r.6 elde If neceeeaty md IJentlty by block r.^r.ber)
This thesis develops a cost/benefit matrix model of deter-
rence processes. The model is designed to assist
_
analysis of
complex multi-nation interactions when an issue vital to the
national survival of each participant is in the balance.
A variety of interactions are examined utilizing the model
to determine if deterrence exists. The analysis of the various
DD | JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 68 15 OBSOLETE
(Page 1) S/N 0102-014-6601 I
Unci as si fie
d




CkC'JUITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGEfH' Dmtm EnCfd'i
interactions results in the conclusion that deterrence exists
when an assured destruction capability exists. Further,
deterrence is lost in certain cases when the assured destruction






Unclass if i ed
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGEOHun Dmf Enfrtd)






Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1969
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of








This thesis develops a cost/benefit matrix model of
deterrence processes. The model is designed to assist analysis
of complex multi-nation interactions when an issue vital to
the national survival of each participant is in the balance.
A variety of interactions are examined utilizing the
model to determine if deterrence exists. The analysis of the
various interactions results in the conclusion that deterrence
exists when an assured destruction capability exists. Further,
deterrence is lost in certain cases when the assured destruc-
tion capability is not maintained.
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I. THE NUCLEAR POLICY PROBLEM
Deterrence has been recognized as an integral component
of strategy since man first fought his brothers for food.
Military strategists throughout mankind's history have en-
dorsed the concept of deterrent force, both in theory and in
the field.
Man is no longer limited to the power of the club when
disputing his neighbor. Today man holds the power and tech-
nological expertise to reach out from the planet of his birth,
light his cities and feed his hungry. It is with this same
power and technology that nations can eradicate cities, devas-
tate populations, and contaminate the Earth.
Deterrence was modified in scope as the power and number
of nuclear nations increased. The production and testing of
the first nuclear devices changed not only the face of warfare
but also the international view of war. The purpose of this
thesis is to investigate deterrence theory and propose a de-
terrence process model based on mutual multi-nation deterrence
A. NUCLEAR WEAPON POWER
To comprehend the magnitude of destruction concomitant
with the failure to develop a viable nuclear policy, it is
first necessary to understand the power of nuclear weaponry.
Brown, in his book NUCLEAR WAR
,
demonstrates the increase in




"The highlight of Napoleon's 1812 campaign against Russia
was the battle of Borodino, and in the course of it his
armies expended the equivalent of about forty tons" of TNT.
The last classic fleet action of history was the battle of
Leyte Gulf which the Americans won by expending 700 tons of
TNT. The British fired off some 50,000 tons in their
Somme Offensive of 1961, but it took them three weeks to do
it. But another total war might involve the release of ex.-
plosive energy equivalent to 100,000,000,000 tons of TNT."
The devastating effects of nuclear power were first ex-
perienced by the inhabitants of Hiroshima, Japan on the sixth
of August 1945. Due to the delivery and detonation of a single
2
nuclear device, 64,000 Japanese perished. Three days later,
a second device with the equivalent explosive power of 20,000
tons of TNT was delivered and detonated over the Japanese city
3
of Nagasaki causing 39,000 deaths.
Professor Henry D. Smyth, a consultant to the MANHATTEN
PROJECT
;
said that the first atomic devices were,
"A weapon... that is potentially destructive beyond the
wildest nightmare of the imagination . "4
In 1973, the document, THE MILITAPY BALANCE 1972-1973, stated
that the Soviet Union was reported to have a nuclear warhead
which upon detonation would generate the equivalent explosive
power of twenty- five million tons of TNT. Such a weapon
would be more than one thousand times as powerful as the weap-
ons which obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The potential
Brown, N. , Nuclear War
,
p. 14, Praeger, 1964.
2Oughterson, A. W. and Shields, W., Medical Effects of the
Atomic Bomb in Japan
,
p. 2., McGraw-Hill"] 1956
.
3 ibid, p. 2.
Gisvannitti, L. , The Decision to Drop the Bomb, p. 307,
Coward-McCann, 1965.

destructive power envisioned by Professor Smyth has increased
through weapon development to the extent that a total nuclear
war might result in the destruction of civilization.
B. NUCLEAR WEAPON NUMBERS
The magnitude of destruction resulting from a nuclear con
flict is dependent on both the power and number of weapons
detonated. The increase in nuclear weapon numbers has been
dramatic.
The first production run of nuclear weapons, in the last
months of World War II, was limited to approximately twelve
devices. In 1948 the nuclear stockpile of the United States
probably did not exceed one hundred and fifty weapons. The
United States exercised its monopoly of nuclear weapon pro-
duction with restraint.
The announcement by Kolotov in late 1947 that,
"There is no longer any secret about the atomic bomb,"
and the confirmation on 23 September 1949 that the Soviet
Union had detonated an atomic device broke the United States'
7
nuclear weapon production monopoly. The Soviet development
of nuclear weapons production facilities, and the weapons
that those facilities produced, spurred the United States to
increase its nuclear inventory. The nuclear weapons arms
race had begun in earnest.
Atlantic Monthly
,
"The Balance of Military Power," p. 23,
June 1951, vol. 187, no. 6.
Questor, G.H., Nuclear Diplomacy
,
pp. 18-23, Dunellen, 1970
7New York Times
,
November 7, 194 7.
10

Exact nuclear warhead figures are not available due to
national security considerations. Though exact figures are
not available , they can be estimated from analysis of produc-
tion facility capabilities and fissile material production.
A 1964 study utilizing such an analysis determined that Great
Britain had perhaps 1,500 nuclear warheads and France had
o
several hundred. In 1970 the same procedure applied to China
resulted in an estimated Chinese nuclear stockpile of several
gdozen warheads. United States' nuclear forces projected to
1977, from the base year of 1972, would credit it with 9,690
warheads. The same projections for the Soviet Union would
estimate the Soviet inventory at 6,750 warheads. Combining
the above projections and estimates yields a world stockpile
approaching 20,000 nuclear warheads by 1977. The tremendous
increase in nuclear warhead numbers compounds the problem of
developing and maintaining a viable nuclear policy.
C. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
The complex problem of nuclear policy development is com-
plicated not only by the magnitude and number of weapons in
existence, but also by the number of nations which possess such
devices. As the number of nations possessing nuclear weaponry
o
SIPRI Yearbook of V.'orld Armaments and Disarmaments 1969 /
1970
,
p . 581 , Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
1970.
9 ibid. p. 381.
10Quanbeck, 11. A., and Blechman, B.M., Issues for the Mid -
Seventies
,
p. 26, Brookings Institute, 1973
.
U ibid. p. 381.
31

increases, the number of divergent national interests served
also increases. In 1945 the United States was the only na-
tion that had the ability to utilize nuclear weapons in pur-
suit of its national interest. Six nations had the ability
to utilize nuclear weapons in pursuit of their various national
interests by 1974.
The increase in the number of nuclear nations and the
speed with which the increase has taken place poses an addi-
tional dimension of complexity to the problem of nuclear policy
development. Table I shows the date each of the nuclear na-
tions entered the nuclear arena. The average rate of entry
to the nuclear club has been approximately one nation every
six years
.
DATES OF FIRST NUCLEAR TEST 12
Nation First Nuclear Test Time L a g From Previous Entry
United States 16 July 1945 Not Applicable
Soviet Union 23 September 1949 4 Years
United Kingdom 2 October 1952 3 Years
France 13 October 1960 8 Years
China 16 October 1964 4 Years
India 18 May 1974 10 Years
TABLE I
12 SIPRI, op. cit. p. 381.
12

D. FUTURE NUCLEAR NATIONS
The nuclear policy-making problem is further confused by
nations possessing the capability of nuclear weapon develop-
ment, for they appear to be the most likely to enter the
nuclear arena in the future. In 1966, nine nations were cred-
ited with the economic, technological and industrial capability
necessary for the development of nuclear weaponry. The nine
nations were the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, Sweden,
13Switzerland, Israel, Italy, India, Japan, and Australia.
Other nations have since developed the required capabilities,
and India has entered the nuclear arena by detonating its
first device in 1974. It must be assumed that additional na-
tions will utilize their nuclear development capabilities and
"go nuclear" within the next few decades.
Though emerging nuclear nations may require several years
or even decades before they individually or in concert can
challenge the lead in nuclear weaponry of the two pre-eminent
super-powers, their mere existence requires re-evaluation of
existing nuclear policies. As emerging nations increase their
stockpiles, their impact on the nuclear policies of the other
nations also increases.
To summarize, the problem of viable nuclear policy formula-
tion is complicated by the dramatic increase in weapon numbers
and individual weapon power. These increases coupled with the
1 3
Knorr, K.E., On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear
Age, p. 119, Princeton University Press, 1966.
13

rapidly expanding number of nuclear nations dictates a con-
tinuous re-examination and modification of existing nuclear
doctrines. Nuclear policy formulation must be dynamic if it
is to cope with continued increases in nuclear nations and
nuclear weapon numbers. A static nuclear policy, in light of
the rapidly changing nuclear situation, is insufficient to
promote the stability of nuclear deterrence and could promote





1 1 . NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE DETERRENCE PROCESS
A. CAPABILITY
In order to elucidate some of the basic tenets of various
nuclear deterrence policies it is first necessary to define
two primary concepts. The two concepts are capability and
credibility.
Nuclear capability consists of two prerequisites. First,
a nation must have a nuclear device, and, second, it must
possess a delivery system or vehicle. Neither the device nor
the delivery vehicle is sufficient by itself to constitute a
nuclear capability.
There exist various levels of capability. The level of
capability any nation possesses at any particular time is de-
pendent upon weapon numbers, weapon power, reliability of
delivery systems, targeting doctrine and other less signifi-
cant factors. There is no particular number of weapons which
equates to a specific level of capability in all situations.
However, there are some useful concepts which stem directly
from capability when viewed in a situational context.
A first strike nuclear capability is one of the various
levels of capability which is dependent upon the situational
context. A first strike nuclear capability is that level of
nuclear weapons and delivery systems which allows one nation
to launch a devastating nuclear attack against another nation.
For the purposes of this thesis, such a strike against another
15

nation, which also possesses a nuclear first strike capability,
is assumed to destroy sufficient numbers of the opponents
weapons to negate any attempt to respond to the first strike
in kind.
A second strike nuclear capability is that level of nuclear
weapons and delivery systems which allows a nation possessing
such a capability to absorb another nation's first strike and
have sufficient remaining \\reapons to devastate the attacker.
Such a capability has also been defined as an assured destruc-
tion capability, in that the launch of a first strike against
such a nation invites that nation's second or retaliatory
strike. A nation with an assured destruction capability en-
sures that its enemy will be destroyed, even if it attacks
without warning, by maintaining sufficient numbers of weapons
and delivery systems.
Such terms as first strike, second strike, and assured
destruction capability are valid only in a situational con-
text. The level of capability which would provide China with
assured destruction of India in the event of nuclear war is
not necessarily the level which will give it the same capa-
bility against the Soviet Union. Similarly, though India may
possess a first strike capability against Pakistan, that level
would not necessarily be sufficient to provide it with a first
strike capability against the United States.
B. CREDIBILITY
Credibility may be defined as believabi li ty . The concept
of credibility is equally applicable to an analysis of one's
16

own nuclear capabilities as it is to an opponent's. What a
nation believes of its own capabilities, how it pe"rceives its
opponents view of its nuclear capabilities, and how it views
its opponent's capabilities are all part of the complex con-
cept of credibility.
The number of weapons possessed or believed to be possessed
by an opponent affects the credibility of the opponent's nu-
clear effectiveness. Due to secrecy of nuclear matters,
exact information concerning enemy weapon strength and target-
ing doctrine is incomplete at best. Projected probabilities,
weapon characteristics, targeting doctrine, defense capabili-
ties, and a host of other factors may reinforce or detract
from the belief that one's own nation or an opponent possesses
a specific leve] of capability. Such a belief may have no
basis in the reality of the situation, and may in fact be a
complete perceptual error.
C. DETERRENCE AND THE DETERRENCE PROCESS
Capability and credibility are inter-related and integral
parts in the concept of nuclear deterrence. The term 'deter-
rence' has a profusion of definitions, and has been defined
at various times as follows:
"(Deterrence) prevents an enemy power taking the decision
to use armed force; (by causing him), to act or react in the
light of the existence, of a set of dispositions which consti-
tute an effective threat."-*- 4
14
1965.





"(Deterrence) is the power of reprisal and the knowledge
that the means of reprisal exists. "15-
"(Deterrence) is the ability to influence someone not to
do something. "1°
"(Deterrence) is a species of political power having the
capacity to induce others to do things or not do things which
they would not otherwise do or refrain from doing."!'7
For the purposes of this thesis, and in the interest of clarity,
it is necessary to more stringently define deterrence. Deter-
rence in this analysis is limited strictly to the concept of
nuclear deterrence, and is defined as an actual or implied
threat of nuclear force by one or more nations which results
in a decision by an opponent to forego initiating the use of
his nuclear weapons.*
From the basic definition of deterrence, it is possible
to construct the minimum criteria if deterrence (nuclear) is
to exist. Deterrence, in order to exist, requires an inter-
action by two or more nations each of which has some level
of credible nuclear capability. In a situation where a na-
tion has no rivals with which to contend the deterrence con-
cept is not operative. It is not sufficient to stipulate that
the two or more nations involved are interacting. They must
Quester, G.S., Deterrence Before Hiroshima , Wiley, 1966.
1 Teti, F.M., A Study of Deterrence
,
p. 107, Naval Post-
graduate School, 19 72.
17Snyder, G.H., "Deterrence and Power," p. 163, Journal
of Conflict Resolution
,
June 1960, vol. 4, no. 2.
*Deterrence and nuclear deterrence may be considered for
the purposes of this thesis as synonyms.
18

be in conflict. Nations which pursue courses of action which
are not in conflict with other nations do so unencumbered by
problems which stem from opposition and consequently avoid
being deterred.
The capability each nation possesses may or may not exist
in reality. It is necessary only that a nation perceive as
credible an opponent's nuclear capability. For deterrence to
exist, it is necessary that each nation pose a credible nu-
clear threat to the others
.
Nuclear capability and credibility are not the sole pre-
requisites for deterrence. The knowledge that an opponent
possesses a nuclear force is not sufficient to deter an ag-
gressor unless it is perceived that the opponent also possesses
the resolve to utilize its force in opposition to the contem-
plated action. The national resolve to utilize nuclear force
is directly related to the perceived value of the issue in
conflict. Recent international interaction do not contradict
the hypothesis that nuclear force and the threat of its use
are instituted only when the nations involved perceive the
issue in conflict to be vital to national security and sur-
vival . *
To summarize, for deterrence to exist there must be at
least two nations each with some credible nuclear capability
in conflict. Further, each nation must perceive that its
opponent has the resolve to utilize nuclear forces as threatened
:The Cuban Missile Crisis is a prime example
19

When these conditions exist, and nuclear exchange is not gen
erated, deterrence can be said to exist.
20

III. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE POLICY
United States nuclear deterrence strategy as a national
policy had its start with the detonation of two nuclear de-
vices during V/orld War II. The detonation of those two weap-
ons established that the United States had a nuclear capability
Nuclear weapons were a reality. More importantly, the United
States had demonstrated its resolve to utilize its nuclear
monopoly to support and assist in the pursuit of its national
aims. Through the detonation of those two nuclear devices the
United States had established the two basic tenets of nuclear
deterrence, capability and credibility.
A. DETERRENCE DOCTRINE
Further amplification of nuclear policy was neither forth-
coming nor necessary due to the nuclear monopoly possessed by
the United States. In fact a complete doctrine of deterrence
through threat of nuclear retaliation was not developed until
1
8
well after 1947. It has been often speculated that the
elucidation of nuclear deterrence policy was prodded by the
Soviet Union's detonation of its first nuclear device in 1949.
Lack of a complete deterrence doctrine is attested to by
the fact of limited nuclear weapons production prior to Soviet
entrance to the nuclear arena. The United States' near
1 o






curtailment of planned nuclear testing during the Berlin crisis
of 1948 strongly implies the existence of only a'minimal nu-
19
clear stockpile and an incomplete targeting doctrine.
Without adequate weapon numbers and a complete targeting doc-
trine, claims of a formal nuclear deterrence policy lack
credence
.
With the detonation of its first nuclear device the Soviet
Union broke the nuclear weapon monopoly held by the United
States. The United States could no longer threaten the use
of its nuclear weapons with impunity. The implicit general
policy of containing the Soviet Union's aggressive tendencies
with the threat of nuclear force became increasingly less
credible as the Soviet stockpile increased. The general
policy of containment, in order to be viable in a world char-
acterized by two nuclear nations, required a more explicit
statement as to national objectives and strategies.
B. NSC-68
The required re-evaluation came in the form of NSC-68.
This document has been called, "the first comprehensive state-
20
ment of a (United States) national strategy." It presented
in detail various national strategies available to the United
States. The option chosen by the United States was one of
collective security and containment of the Soviet Union and
ibid. pp. 4-6.
20 Teti, op. cit. p. 39.
22

the People's Republic of China. The narrowness of the general
policy of containment had been replaced with a more complete
doctrine of collective security and containment.
C. NSC-162
As Unites States nuclear forces expanded and general pur-
pose forces declined, NSC-68 became untenable. NSC-162 replaced
NSC-68 and expounded the virtues of massive nuclear retaliation
during the envisioned long term idealogical conflict with the
21Soviet Union.
The strategy of massive retaliation incorporated a sub-
strategy, often referred to as the "trip-wire." This sub-
strategy entailed initiating a nuclear attack against the
Soviet Union if the Soviet Union were to trip the wire of
American response by attacking NATO forces in Europe. Such
a strategy attempted to make credible the idea that nuclear
force could and would be utilized to ensure victory for the
NATO forces.
Continued Soviet development of nuclear weapons and de-
livery systems coupled with the maintenance of large conven-
tional forces decreased the credibility of massive retaliation.
In the words of one European commentator, referring to the
policy of massive retaliation,
"Our (NATO's) present policy, which Mr. Dulles has labeled
'massive retaliation' seems to be becoming too drastic and
inflexible for these objectives. Increasingly, we are get-
ting into a position where, in effect, we shall be forced to
21 ibid. p. 114
23

threaten, and if necessary initiate, the destruction of
civilization in the event of any measure of aggression too
powerful for our small conventional forces to combat. "^2
D. FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
In 1962 a new policy embracing flexible response was in-
stituted. Flexible response was articulated as allowing the
armed forces of the United States to be employed as required,
to the degree required, when required, in the manner required.
The policy of flexible response no longer restricted the
United States to an all-or-nothing conflict. This new doc-
trine was supported by an increase in expenditures for general
purpose conventional forces, thereby allowing a truly flexible
response in the conventional as well as the nuclear arena.
The doctrine of flexible response was developed primarily
to avert total war and to allow for the resolution of con-
flict at significantly lower levels of combat and destruction.
In the general policy of flexible response various targeting
strategies have been embraced. The two most widely accepted
targeting doctrines are counterforce and countervalue
.
Counterforce targeting is based upon the concept that the
threat of delivery of nuclear weapons against the opposition's
military forces is sufficient to avoid maximum nuclear re-
taliation by limiting nuclear destruction and removing the
threat to national survival. Countervalue targeting is more
encompassing in that it is based upon the belief that targeting
22
Buzzard, A., "The H Bomb, Massive Retaliation or
Graduated Deterrence," p. 148, International Affairs ,
April 1956, vol. 32, no. 2.
24

should include population and industrial centers as well as
military installations. Where counterforce targeting en-
visions a limited nuclear exchange with minimal, damage to
population and industrial centers, countervalue targeting en-
visions a weapons exchange on a city- for-city , installation-,
for-installation basis.
Both counterforce and countervalue targeting are viable
targeting doctrines at levels of conflict below that level
of nuclear weapon exchange which would threaten national sur-
vival. As targeting doctrines, each offers additional levels
of response which a nation may employ in order to avoid act-
ing or reacting on a level which would endanger an opponent's
or its own national survival. The ability to utilize addi-
tional levels of response may increase the amount of time a
nation has in which to select alternative courses of action
or re-evaluate its position, but ultimately nuclear deterrence
must rest in the concept of assured destruction of the enemy.
Inasmuch as the concept of flexible response combines
counterforce and countervalue targeting with an assured des-
truction capability, it is viable and indeed preferable.
However, to ignore or underallocate sufficient resources to
maintain an assured destruction capability is to destroy the
ability to exercise a truly flexible response. It is vital
that any nation which aspires to hold a position as a super-
power and world leader be able to utilize a complete range of
response and not one truncated at the ultimate level, that
level being the assured destruction of one's enemies.
25

IV. THE CONCEPTUAL COST/BENEFIT MODEL
In order to develop a deterrence model, it is first neces-
sary to accept three assumptions. First, it must be assumed
that nations act in a rational manner in affairs directly
linked to national survival. Second, it must be assumed that
every nation possesses a unique national system of values with
which it evaluates costs and benefits associated with various
courses of action. The third assumntion is that the loss of
£
national survival is perceived as an infinite cost by each
nation.
A. RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING
In analyzing the nuclear deterrence process, it is of pri-
mary importance to assume rational decision-making. Conceptual
modeling techniques do not allow for irrational decision-making
processes, though they definitely exist. Leadership char-
acterized by lunacy does not lend itself to modeling. Rational
and non-rational decision-making do lend themselves to process
analysis. When the decision-making apparatus of a nation is
confronted with a situation where the decision is directly
linked to national survival, this thesis assumes that a rational
decision-making process will be utilized.
Allison, G.T., "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile
Crisis , ' ' The American Political Science Review
,
vol. 63,
no. 3, pp. 689-718.
26

B. NATIONAL VALUE SYSTEMS
Rational decision-making requires a comparison of al-
ternatives against some criteria and toward some goal. The
criteria utilized and the goal pursued are derived by a na-
tion from its unique system of national values. Kennan
alluded to the uniqueness of national value systems when he
stated that nations should,
"exercise the modesty to admit that ... (each nation's)
national interest is all (it) is really capable of under-
standing." 24
To accept Kennan is to accept that each nation does have a
unique value system, and further, that its value system is the
only one that it can -accurately employ. Consequently, actions
which appear rational to one nation's value system may seem
non-rational or irrational when viewed through another sys-
tem of values
.
C. CONCEPTUAL COST/BENEFIT MODEL
It is from the set of national values that the conceptual
modeling of cost/benefit relationships springs. .Utilizing
the assumption of rational decision-making and recognizing
the importance of national value systems, Klaus Knorr developed
a conceptual formula of cost/benefit relationships as applied
25
to military power. His model states that the utility de-
rived from the development of a military force is equal to the




25 Knorr, op. cit. p. 9.
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value placed upon the benefits derived from such a force minus
the costs incurred. Knorr concludes that the utility is equal
to the difference between aggregate benefits and aggregate
costs. In mathematical symbology Knorr' s concept can be ex-
pressed as follows:
V =XB -2C
The formula states that the value (V) of an action is equal
to the summation of perceived benefits (£B) minus the summa-
tion of perceived costs (EC) .
D. MODEL APPLICATION
Knorr's model is especially useful in that it permits
evaluation of alternative courses of action in situations in-
volving potential nuclear conflict over issues threatening
national survival of one or more nations. Applying Knorr's
concept to a two nation interaction problem, the conceptual
cost/benefit formulas for each nation may be developed subject
to the following assumptions.
(1) Both nations involved in the interaction consider
the issue to be vital to their national survival.
(2) Each nation possesses a nuclear first strike capa-
bility, and neither nation possesses a nuclear
second strike capability.
(3) Neither nation can solve the problem by conventional
means
.
Utilizing the above assumptions for an interaction between two




courses of action appear feasible. The first is to launch a
first strike, and the second is to refrain from launching a
first strike. The cost/benefit formulas for Alpha are as
follows
:
(1) First Strike Launched
Value of First Strike = (Summation of Benefits from
First Strike) - (Summation
of Costs from First Strike)
V =2B - ££
FS FS FS
(2) No Strike
Value of No Strike = (Summation of Benefits from No
Strike) - (Summation of Costs
from No Strike)
V =2B - -3LC
NS NS NS
As previously stated, it is the national value system that
allows for the valuation of the various alternative courses
of action. It is, however, possible to evaluate the alterna-
tive courses of action presented here without comprehensive
knowledge concerning the national value system if loss of
national survival is considered to be an infinite cost. Ap-
plying the concept of infinite cost to the problem of alterna-
tive selection, two points become apparent. First, alternative
(1) ensures the survival of the nation employing such an action
by destroying its opponent and consequently resolving the issue
in conflict in its favor. Second, alternative (2) is dependent
upon the action the opposing nation implements. If the oppos-
ing nation opts for a "No Strike" policy, the issue in conflict
will remain in conflict, with both nations' national survival
29

threatened. If the opposing nation opts for a "First Strike"
policy, it will destroy its opponent and resolve'the issue
in conflict in its favor.
Examining the value of the two alternative courses of
action in such a manner reveals that alternative (1) will
have some value which may be positive or negative, but will
in all cases be preferable to the value of alternative (2)
,
given that the opposing nation implements its first strike
option. Inasmuch as the alternative courses of action are ap-
plicable to both nation Alpha and Bravo, each nation will (due
to the concept of infinite cost associated with loss of
national survival) avoid those courses of action which allow
that infinite cost to be exacted. In such a situation, both
Alpha and Bravo would avoid alternative (2) and opt for al-
ternative (1) as the only rational alternative to be pursued.
In fact both nations may reasonably and rationally perceive
the cost/benefit evaluation of alternative (1) as an impera-
tive for launching a first strike, for it is the only course
of action which ensures both national survival and resolution
of the issue, regardless of an opponent's subsequent actions.
Though cost/benefit relationships become increasingly
difficult to quantify and analyze as international implica-
tions are considered, the approach is useful if it is accepted
that the loss of national survival is considered to be an in-
finite cost. Rational decision makers must consider the in-
finite cost associated with the loss of national survival and
act accordingly. The model as presented may seem to imply
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that two nations, each possessing a nuclear first strike ca-
pability, are doomed to engage in nuclear war. Such an impli-
cation is false, for only when those nations are involved in
direct conflict over an issue, which is itself vital to the
national survival of each, does the decision to launch a
first strike become rational.
The cost/benefit model presented here is not a deterrence
model. It is not a nuclear deterrence model because neither
nation would rationally be deterred from the launch of its
nuclear forces. The model demonstrates the applicability of
the cost/benefit concept to interaction analysis between nuclear
nations and is consistent with the assumptions of rationality,
national value systems and infinite cost.
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V. THE MULTI -NATION DETERRENCE MODEL
The concept of assured destruction through retaliatory
response is not operative in a world characterized by only
two nuclear nations each possessing only a first strike capa-
bility. In order to employ a truly flexible response, a na-
tion must possess a broader range of nuclear capabilities.
The basis for analyzing flexible response multi-nation
interactions is the cost/benefit analysis presented earlier.
Expanding the basic cost/benefit interaction model for the
two nation problem, it is possible to present the resultant
values of alternative courses of action in a matrix format.
A. MATRIX PRESENTATION OF COST/BENEFIT FORMULATION
Subject to the same assumptions utilized in the two nation
cost/benefit scenario depicted earlier, the value for the two
alternative courses of action nations Alpha and Bravo may em-
ploy are as follows
:
(1) First. Strike Launched
Value of First Strike = (Summation of Benefits from
First Strike) - (Summation
of Costs from First Strike)
V =2B - TELC
FS FS FS
(2) No Strike
Value of No Strike = (Summation of Benefits from No
Strike) - (Summation of Costs
from No Strike)




As discussed earlier, alternative (1) is the only alternative
which ensures survival of the nation employing it regardless
of the action that the opposing nation implements. The value
of alternative (1) can be equated to national survival, and
presented in payoff matrix format as follows:























Tracing nation Alpha's alternative A-l across row 1 yields the
same results that the cost/benefit model yielded, in that, a
first strike by nation. Alpha destroys nation Bravo and ensures
Alpha's survival. Again referring to row 1, the payoff matrix
addresses the incompatibility of both nations launching a first
strike simultaneously. The matrix is also useful in demonstrat
ing the value of alternative A- 2. It displays that the value
to Alpha of the alternative that it employs is dependent upon
the alternative course of action that Bravo pursues. The re-
sults of the matrix can be seen to correspond to the results
obtained from the cost/benefit equation analysis presented
earlier. In addition, the matrix displays that if both nations
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opt for a no strike strategy the result is survival with con-
tinued conflict. The continued conflict results"1 from the fact
that such a choice of alternatives will not resolve the
original issue.
The payoff matrix for nation Bravo is identical to the
one presented for Alpha due to the fact that each nation pos-
sesses the same options and capabilities. The equality of
participant's matricies will not hold for all cases as will
be demonstrated later.
B. TWO NATION UNEQUAL CAPABILITY MODEL
The utility of the matrix approach lies in its ability to
deal with unequal levels of capability and multi-nation
problems. The matrix approach allows for detailed analysis
of possible alternatives and the determination as to whether
or not deterrence is present in the interaction.
Utilizing the assumptions of rational decision-making,
infinite cost associated with the loss of national survival,
and a system of national values, the following s.cenario may
be developed. Two nations, Alpha and Bravo, are involved in
a conflict over an issue considered to be vital to the
national survival of each. The issue can not be resolved by
conventional means. Nation Alpha possesses an assured destruc-
tion capability against nation Bravo, and Bravo possesses a
first strike capability against Alpha.




ALPHA'S ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION
A-l First Strike
A-2 No First Strike
•
. A-3 Retaliatory Strike
BRAVO 'S ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION
B-l First Strike
B-2 No First Strike
Applying the concepts of cost/benefit relationships, and in-
finite cost associated with the loss of national survival,
the value of each alternative course of action can be deter-
mined. The values can then be presented in a matrix payoff
format. The payoff matrix for nation Alpha for the scenario
as presented, is displayed in Table II.
























As before, the matrix displays the assumption that simul-
taneous launch is not considered possible. In addition, it
must be assumed that a course of action resulting in survival
and resolution of the issue in conflict is preferable to one
which results in survival with continued conflict. Examining
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Table II, it is apparent that Alpha's rational choice of al-
ternatives must be that of a first strike. Only" a first
strike strategy (A-l) ensures Alpha's survival and the resolu-
tion of the issue in conflict regardless of the course of
action Bravo pursues.
A further simplification of Alpha's payoff matrix is pos-
sible. Inasmuch as strategies A-2 and A-3 present the same
payoffs, they may be combined and presented as one strategy.
Such a combination is conceptually valid when it is remembered
that by definition a retaliatory strike can be employed by a
nation only if it has not already utilized its first strike
option.
ALPHA'S ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION
A-l First Strike
A-2 No First Strike, Retaliatory Strike If Attacked
The combined alternatives evaluated as before yields the
simplified payoff matrix presented in Table III.






















The simplified payoff matrix displayed in Table III pre-
sents the same results as the expanded matrix. In both ma-
tricies, the preferability of strategy A-l is apparent.
Alternative A-l is the only alternative which Alpha can pursue
without risking loss of national survival. Acting rationally,
Alpha would be faced with a decision where a first strike
against Bravo would be imperative. From this analysis, it
may be concluded that Alpha has not been deterred if it acts
rationally.
A complete analysis of the scenario is not possible with-
out an examination of Bravo's payoff matrix. Utilizing the
complete set of alternatives presented earlier, Bravo's payoff
matrix could be developed as in Table IV.



























In analyzing Bravo's payoff matrix, there appears to be
no dominate strategy. In fact a first strike strategy, (B-l),
appears viable and of little more danger to notional survival
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than a no strike strategy, (B-2). The matrix, however, im-
plicitly addresses the concept of credibility, in that, for
Bravo to rationally employ a first strike strategy it must
consider that the retaliatory strike Alpha possesses is not
credible. If Bravo perceives that Alpha's strike is credible
and would be employed, Bravo's payoff matrix would be altered
The certainty of response to attack could be represented by
combining Alpha's alternatives as before. Combination of
Alpha's alternatives would result in the simplified matrix



















Table V demonstrates that due to the assumption that
Alpha's retaliatory response is credible, Bravo is faced with
a dominate strategy. By not employing a first strike strategy
Bravo lias a possibility for survival with continued conflict.
A first strike strategy ensures Bravo's destruction and loss
of national survival. As a rational nation, Bravo would be
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forced to avoid any alternative which did not have some form
of national survival as one of its outcomes.
The matrix analysis implies that Bravo would be rationally
deterred from initiating a nuclear exchange only as long as
it perceived that Alpha's retaliatory response was credible.
Bravo's choice of a no strike alternative is directly dependent
upon the credibility of Alpha's response. If Alpha's credi-
bility is lost, Bravo may no longer be deterred.
Two important points may be drawn from this two nation
interaction model. First, nation Alpha is not deterred, but
instead has a first strike imperative. Second, nation Bravo
is deterred by the assured destruction capability of its op-
ponent only as long as the opponent's assured destruction
capability remains credible.
C. TWO NATION EQUAL CAPABILITY MODEL
As the nations of the world increase their nuclear capa-
bility, additional levels of nuclear interaction are possible.
Instead of only one of the participants being deterred, both
may perceive a no strike strategy as the dominate strategy to
be pursued. Such a situation arises when two nations in con-
flict each possesses an assured destruction capability against
the other.
Utilizing the previous assumptions, the following courses
of action may be considered feasible:
ALPHA'S ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION
A-l First Strike
A-2 No First Strike, Retaliatory Strike If Attacked
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BRAVO' S ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION
B-l First Strike
B-2 No First Strike, Retaliatory Strike If Attacked
Applying the concept of cost/benefit relationships as before,
the various alternatives may be evaluated. The results are
presented in Tables VI and VII, for Alpha and Bravo respective
iy.









































The payoff matricies for Alpha and Bravo are identical
due to the identical capabilities and options that each nation
possesses. Inasmuch as the payoffs are identical, the dominate
strategy for Alpha must also be the dominate strategy for
Bravo. The strategy of no first strike, being the only stra-
tegy which results in the possibility of survival, in any
form, is the dominate strategy.
In such a situation, both nations would rationally be de-
terred from initiating a nuclear exchange, for to do so would
ensure one's own destruction. It is the retaliatory capa-
bility of the opponent which makes the only rational decision
that of opting for a no first strike strategy.
Until the capability or the credibility of the opponent's
retaliatory response declines, mutual deterrence will exist.
The nations involved will either compromise on the issue or
alter their capabilities in order to ensure the resolution of
the issue in their favor.
Comparing the two nation equal capability model to the
two nation unequal capability model results in the following
conclusions. First, if both nations possess assured destruc-
tion capabilities mutual deterrence will exist. Further,
such deterrence will remain stable as long as each nation
possesses its assured destruction capability and perceives
that its opponent's retaliatory response is credible. Second,
when one of the nations does not possess or fails to maintain
an assured destruction capability, it presents its opponent
with a first strike imperative. In any situation where there
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exists a first strike imperative the nuclear balance of power
is highly unstable
.
D. THREE NATION EQUAL CAPABILITY MODEL
Assured destruction through retaliatory response is not
the only cause of deterrence. Deterrence may also occur when
none of the nations involved possesses more than a first
strike capability if at least three such nations are inter-
acting.
Utilizing the same assumptions applied to previous models,
it is possible to develop a three nation interaction model.
It is further assumed that each nation's first strike capabil-
ity can be utilized only once, and if employed must be employed
in its entirety against one opponent. Inasmuch as each nation
possesses an identical capability, the same basic set of al-
ternatives may be envisioned for each as follows:
ALPHA'S ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION
A- 1 First Strike Against Bravo
A- 2 First Strike Against Charlie
A-3 No First Strike
BRAVO' S ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION
B-l First Strike Against Alpha
B-2 First Strike Against Charlie
B-3 No First Strike
CHARLIE'S ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION
C-l First Strike Against Alpha
C-2 First Strike Against Bravo
C-3 No First Strike
In order to develop the resultant payoff matricies from




1. No two nations act in concert.
2. Nations have no retaliatory capability if struck
by another nation's first strike.
3. After launch of its first strike, no nation
possesses any additional capability.
Due to the symmetry of alternatives and capabilities, a
first strike by any one of the three opposing nations results
in the same basic outcome. For example, it may be assumed
that Alpha implements strategy A-l, a first strike against
Bravo
.
Implementation of strategy A-l leaves Alpha with no re-
maining nuclear capability. Due to the effects of Alpha's
strike, Bravo no longer possesses any nuclear capability and
is for the purposes of this scenario destroyed as a nation.
Charlie is the only nation which would possess a first strike
capability and its full range of options. Analyzing the re-
maining alternatives the payoff matricies in Tables VIII and
IX may be developed.










































Alpha's payoff matrix demonstrates that its survival is
contingent upon Charlie either refraining from launching its
first strike, or Charlie launching its first strike against
Bravo. Charlie's payoff matrix demonstrates that the payoff
derived from launching a first strike against Bravo is equal
to the payoff derived from refraining to launch any strike.
However, a strategy of first strike against Alpha ensures
the survival of Charlie without continued conflict. Alterna-
tive C-l is a dominate strategy for Charlie. Inasmuch as it
is assumed that survival without continued conflict is prefer-
able to survival with continued conflict, Charlie is presented
with a first strike imperative against Alpha.
The scenario can be generalized due to equal capabilities
and identical alternatives to yield the following conclusions.
First, in a three nation interaction characterized by equal
first strike capability, any nation which implements a first
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strike presents the remaining nuclear nation with a first
strike imperative. Second, nations would not rationally be
willing to present a first strike imperative to an opponent
by utilization of their first strike option. Consequently,
the only rational option is the no strike option. Only by
employing a no strike strategy can each nation ensure its
survival. In essence, each nation is deterred from initiat-
ing a nuclear exchange by the remaining nation's nuclear
capability and potential first strike option. The third
nation's capability acts in the same manner as an assured
destruction capability in a two nation model. In both
scenarios deterrence exists, but it is the result of the num-
ber of participants in the three nation model presented here
rather than a difference in capabilities.
E. THREE NATION MIXED CAPABILITY MODEL
The nuclear picture of the world today is that of two
nations each with an assured destruction capability against
the other, and a. third nation rapidly developing a first
strike capability. In addition to these three nations, three
other nations possess some nuclear capability. As China de-
velops its first strike capability nuclear policy decisions
in both the Soviet Union and the United States will be affected
The evolving nuclear situation can be modeled as before.
Utilizing the same basic set of assumptions of rationality,
infinite cost associated with loss of national survival, and
a system of national values, the following scenario may be
developed. Three nations are in conflict over an issue each
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perceives as vital to its national survival. Two of the na-
tions, Alpha and Bravo, each possess an assured destruction
capability against each other. The third nation, Charlie,
possesses only a first strike capability. Subject to the fol
lowing additional assumptions the payoff matrix for each of
the nations can be developed.
1. The assured destruction capability of Alpha and
Bravo permit them to absorb a first strike from
any one nation and respond with sufficient weap-
ons to devastate their attacker.
2. Neither Alpha or Bravo have sufficient weapons to
launch the equivalent of two first strikes, or to
launch a first strike and a devastating retaliatory
strike
.
3. Nation Charlie has the capability to launch only a
first strike and if struck with a first strike will
not be capable of response.
4. No two nations act in concert.
5. Assured destruction nations employ their retaliatory
response against the nation which attacks them.
Subject to the above assumptions, the following alterna-
tive courses of action appear feasible.
ALPHA'S ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACT ION
A- 1 First Strike Against Bravo
A- 2 First Strike Against Charlie
A- 3 No First Strike, Retaliatory Strike If Attacked
BRAVO 'S ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION
B-l First Strike Against Alpha
B-2 First Strike Against Charlie
B-3 No First Strike, Retaliatory Strike If Attacked
CHARLIE'S ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION
C-l First Strike Against Alpha
C-2 First Strike Against Bravo
C-3 No First Strike
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The analysis of the interaction will be approached by
assuming an initial action has taken place and examining the
resulting payoff matrix to determine if the assumed action
should have been employed or avoided. Three types of inter-
actions are possible.
1. Type I
It may be assumed that Charlie launches a first strike
against either Alpha or Bravo. This action immediately in-
vites retaliatory response from the nation attacked resulting
in destruction of Charlie in the same manner as depicted in
Table V for Bravo. Thus, Charlie is deterred from launching
a first strike by the assured destruction capability of na-
tions Alpha and Bravo.
It should be noted that, if for any reason the re-
taliatory capability of the attacked nation is not employed
against Charlie, the remaining nuclear power is presented
with a first strike imperative against Charlie. Such an im-
perative would result from the belief that the nation suffer-
ing Charlie's first strike did not in fact possess a retaliatory
capability. Consequently, the interaction for the first strike
imperative would be similar to that presented in Table II.
Under either set of circumstances, Charlie would not
rationally be willing to launch a first strike against Alpha
or Bravo. By launching a first strike Charlie ensures its own






A second set of interactions occurs if one of the as-
sured destruction capable nations attacks the other. In this
scenario such an interaction would be either Alpha striking
Bravo or Bravo striking Alpha. This situation is identical
to the situation payoffs displayed in Tables VI and VII. By
launching against an assured destruction nuclear power the
launching nation ensures its own destruction by inviting re-
taliatory response. In effect a first strike by either assured
destruction capable nation obliterates both and leaves the re-
maining nation intact.
Consequently, if the assured destruction nations act
in a rational manner they would opt for a no strike strategy.
Both Alpha and Bravo would be deterred from a first strike




Finally, if it is assumed that one of the assured des-
truction capable nations launches a first strike against
Charlie, another aspect of the interaction may be investigated.
For example, a first strike by Alpha against Charlie results
in the destruction of Charlie and the elimination of Alpha's
first strike and assured destruction (retaliatory) capability.
However, Alpha and Bravo would continue in conflict over the
original issue. The payoff matrix for nation Bravo in such
a situation is presented in Table X.
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PAYOFF MATRIX FOR NATION BRAVO
Nation Alpha Alternatives
(No Effective Nuclear Capability)
N A
A L
T T B-l Survival
I E
R
N N B-2 Survival
A
B T





Examination of Table X reveals that Bravo is presented
with a dominate strategy. A first strike against Alpha en-
sures survival without continued conflict. Consequently,
Bravo is presented with a first strike imperative against
Alpha. Considering that the issue in conflict is vital to
national survival, Bravo would be acting rationally if and
only if it employed its first strike against Alpha.
If Alpha is a rational nation, it would not attack Charlie
for to do so would present Bravo with a first strike impera-
tive. Similarly, Bravo would not be willing to attack Charlie
and present Alpha with a first strike imperative. Both as-
sured destruction capable nations would be deterred from an
attack on Charlie by the first strike imperative that such an
attack would give to the other assured destruction power.
The model addressed in the presentation of the three types
of interaction is a deterrence model. No participant in-
volved in the interaction would rationally be willing to
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initiate a first strike against any other participant. To do
so is to invite either a retaliatory response, or present an
opponent with a first strike imperative. In each of the three
type interactions which compose the three nation mixed capa-
bility model, each nation would rationally follow a no strike
alternative. With a no strike alternative the only rational
alternative which can be implemented, the interaction results
in stable mutual deterrence.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. THE NUCLEAR SITUATION
The advent of nuclear weaponry added a new dimension to
the concept of deterrence. The dramatic increase in des-
tructive power available to potential belligerents dictated
the development of some form of nuclear restraint. Nuclear
deterrence policies were envisioned as providing the required
restraint. Such policies had as their ultimate goal the
prevention of nuclear warfare.
As the level of nuclear capability possessed by potential
belligerents increased and additional nuclear nations emerged,
existing deterrence doctrines required modification. Deter-
rence doctrines addressed the concept of assured destruction
through retaliatory response, but did not explicitly address
the increase in possible interactions due to the expansion of
the nuclear community. Policies of flexible response were in-
stituted to deal with interactions other than total nuclear
war.
B. THE ANALYTICAL MODEL
The method of investigating the various interactions pos-
sible in the expanded nuclear community was based on the per-
ceived cost/benefit relationships alternative actions provided.
Utilizing the basic cost/benefit relationships each alternative
provided, it was possible to formulate a hierarchy of resultant
values. The three resultant values specifically dealt with
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were survival, survival with continued conflict, and total
destruction. The resultant values were shown to" be dependent
in several cases upon the alternative course of action imple-
mented by one or more opponents.
In order to display the interaction process which cul-
minates in the resultant values a matrix format was used. By
applying such a format, it became possible to analyze multi-
nation interactions as well as interactions in which partici-
pants possessed different levels of capability. The matrix
display allowed for the concise presentation of complex in-




From the analysis of the interactions presented in the
body of the thesis, four important conclusions may be drawn.
First, assured destruction provides deterrence in all cases.
Regardless of the number of nations interacting, the nation
which possesses an assured destruction capability deters po-
tential aggressors by threatening their survival with its
retaliatory response.
Second, nations which have only a first strike capability
may present an opponent with a first strike imperative. Con-
sequently, the failure to maintain an assured destruction
capability either through loss of credibility or reduced capa-
bility might endanger a nation's survival.
Third, specific targeting doctrines are useful inasmuch
as they are effective in deterring nuclear exchange at levels
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below those which endanger national survival. However, such
policies and targeting doctrines can not be allowed to de-
tract from a nation's assured destruction capability without
thwarting the very reason for the development of deterrence
policy.
Finally, deterrence may exist in the absence of an assured
destruction capability as an interaction phenomenon when three
or more nations are involved. Deterrence of this type is as
effective as deterrence from an assured destruction capability
but it is an interaction result rather than a planned outcome
by any particular nation.
D. AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
The cost/benefit approach presented in this thesis opens
new and interesting areas for further research. Utilizing the
basic modeling procedures, maximum and minimum desirable
levels of nuclear capability can be investigated. Expanding
the modeling approach will allow for the investigation of
nuclear interactions at levels below that of national survival
Targeting doctrines may also be investigated and analyzed for
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